handled. An occurrence of internal contamination of workers was also suspected. Therefore, workers were measured in vivo and bioassay was performed too. 
standard sources for alpha and gamma spectrometry, etc. The original material was AmO 2 powder, imported from the former Soviet Union. The production of radionuclide sources included chemical treatment of original AmO 2 powder; for some purposes, the americium nitrate was the base. The production of sources for smoke detectors was performed by means of powder metallurgy. The briquettes from americium oxide were encapsulated by rolling into gold and silver foil and afterwards cut for the use as the radioactive sources in smoke detectors. Some of these operations were performed in hermetic boxes. At present time, these hermetic boxes have not been used any more and it was suspected that they could be a source of contamination in the laboratory, causing internal contamination of workers from time to time. Therefore, it was decided to remove the boxes and put them into radioactive waste. When dismantling and fragmenting the hermetic boxes for the cementation into waste drums, release of 241 Am into working environment occurred and suspicion of internal contamination of workers took place.
Materials and methods

Description of the event
The whole process of transportation of the boxes from the original place of use to the waste management facility and process of the fragmentation and cementation into drums took three weeks' time in June and July 2001. The owner of the boxes estimated the activity of 241 Am, remaining on the inner surfaces of the 3 boxes to be 150, 180 and 50 MBq, based on the measurement of the surface activity of inner and outer surfaces of the boxes. As to hinder the spread of radioactive material, the boxes were covered by fixating lacquer. Afterwards they were separated from each other, wrapped in plastic sheets and transported to the fragmentation unit of Radioactive Waste Department of the Nuclear Research Institute. During dismantling of the first two boxes, there were presumably no signals about the release of activity. However, during the dismantling of the third box, measurements of filters from the air activity measurement device from previous periods had been completed and showed that investigation level for the alpha activity (0.06 Bq/m 3 ) in air had been exceeded (1.7 Bq /m 3 on the filter from 10th July). Protective face masks of 4 workers were measured and significant activity of 241 Am was found on them, therefore a suspicion of internal contamination of workers had arisen. It was found that respirators (protective face masks from filtration material) and rubber gloves had been used repeatedly and stored in plastic bags between individual operations, therefore secondary contamination of them during the storage was possible (Report SÚJB, 2002) . The work clothes were contaminated too and had been put into the radioactive waste without CONTAMINATION OF SEVEN WORKERS WITH 241 AM distinguishing individual level of contamination. These clothes could have probably been a source of secondary internal contamination. On the basis of the first in vivo measurements some workers seemed to be qualified for treatment by DTPA infusions. Six workers were hospitalised and treated by two doses of 1g Ca -DTPA (Klener et al., 2003) , one of the workers (V.V.) preferred to take his holidays.
In vivo measurements of 241 Am activity
19 workers were measured for 241 Am by a whole body counter with HPGe detector and their heads and knees were measured with two special LEGe detectors. The LEGe detectors had been calibrated for measurements of content of 241 Am in skeleton as measurements of 241 Am in the skeleton were used for retrospective study, which has been under way in the National Radiation Protection Institute in Prague (Malátová et al., 2003a) . A calibration for the 241 Am activity in lungs had been intended too and a phantom of lungs had been ordered from the IAEA, however, phantom reached the NRPI only a year after the described incident. Therefore, only ad hoc measurements, without previous calibration of the thorax were performed with the aim to estimate activity in lungs.
From the very beginning, there was a suspicion that significant activity on the skin all over the body was present, however, not measurable by the detection instruments (Digital Contamination Monitor LB 1210 E) for the surface alpha activity. The surface contamination was proven when 241 Am activity was detected in the sample of cut hair and on the bedclothes of one worker. Slow decline of the activity measured in the heads instead of expected increase according to the ICRP Publication 78 (ICRP, 1997) model as shown for one case in Figure 1 , also proved skin contamination. Therefore, the results of measurements in vivo served only as a warning that internal contamination of an individual had occurred and that widespread contamination of the workplace probably existed.
Measurement of 241 Am in excretion
The workers, at whom measurable activity of Am was found by in vivo counting, were instructed immediately to collect 24 hour samples of faeces and urine trough three consecutive days. Such approach was used as people with irremovable surface contamination had higher probability of internal contamination. For screening purposes the samples of excreta were first measured by semiconductor gamma spectrometry in native state. Native urine was poured into six cylindrical vessels of 200 ml content each, which were placed around the HPGe detector. The minimum detectable activity (MDA) for this geometry and time of measurement 2 hours was 2 to 3 Bq per sample, depending on efficiency of detector used. No measurable activity of 241 Am was found in any of the urine samples in native state, therefore radiochemical separation of Am followed by alpha spectrometry was used (Dulaiová et al., 2004) for determination of activity.
As to obtain information about internal contamination as soon as possible, samples of faeces were measured first in the vessel in which they were brought, afterwards in a 200-ml vessel. Vessels were placed on the front of an HPGe detector for measurements. When activities of 241 Am per sample decreased below 3 Bq, samples of faeces were deep frozen, dried, ashed at the temperature below 450°C and measured by gamma spectrometry using counting times at least 10 000 s. Ash was put either at the bottom of cylindrical vessel and placed on the cap of coaxial HPGe detector for measurement or in a small test tube, which was put in the well of the HPGe well type detector. When using the well detector and a long time of measurement (up to 3 days), minimum detectable activity was 0.01 Bq/sample. According to the amount of faeces ash, the whole ashed sample or only a part was used.
Results
Results of measurements
Results of in vivo measurements are not presented as they were seriously influenced by surface contamination and therefore had to be discarded. The suspicion that the substantial part of "the body activity" is a surface contamination has arisen immediately after the first few measurements. It, however, persisted after many showers. Massive surface contamination as well as the significant activity in samples of faeces led to investigation at the workplace.
Results of activity of 241 Am in faeces and urine of 7 workers are presented in Tables I to VII. They include not only activities, found in excretion in the short time after the event, but also activities found in samples collected up to one and a half year after the incident. Values of activities in urine found shortly after the administration of Ca-DTPA, which are not suitable for the estimation of intake using standard biokinetic model, are denoted by asterisk.
The activities found on the face masks of the 4 workers are given in Table VIII .
Estimation of intakes and committed effective doses
The estimation of the dose was complicated due to surface skin contamination of workers, uncertainty of the time of the intakes, unknown way of intakes (ingestion vs. inhalation) and probably repeated smaller intakes. The knowledge of the physico-chemical form of the contaminant was rather limited. In the hermetic boxes 241 Am in the form of AmO 2 was allegedly processed, however, presence of americium nitrate in the boxes in the past could not be excluded either. An influence of the fixating lacquer on the composition of the contaminant was also possible.
The ICRP 78 biokinetic model of 241 Am for the inhalation (ICRP, 1997), mostly with default parameters (aerosol of class M and AMAD 5 µm) was used for the estimation of the intakes and of the committed effective doses. It has to be based on measurements of 241 Am activity in the excretion only. Software IMBA Professional Plus, which uses maximum likelihood method for fitting experimental values by excretion curves, was used for the evaluation. The data sets from measurements of excreted activity with urine and with faeces were used simultaneously. Logarithmic-normal distribution of the experimental data was assumed. For activity excreted in urine total uncertainty 1.3, for activity in faeces total uncertainty 3 was supposed. The total uncertainty includes biological variability, sampling errors, counting errors etc. (Doerfel et al., 2005) . The best fits for the most workers were obtained when combination of acute and chronic intakes was used; in some cases, combination of intakes of class M and S seemed to be the best approximation. The time of the intake was chosen according to work diaries, and according to the investigation made after the incident. Generally, after the stay in the hospital the workers went on holidays and didn't return to the workplace until mid-August 2001. Therefore, the time interval 20-60 days was supposed as the time in which intake of 241 Am didn't occur.
The resulting intakes and committed effective doses CED are presented in Table IX . Excreted activities in urine after the application of DTPA were excluded Figures 2a to 2d . When calculating the intake of worker V.V., time of sampling of faeces 3.5 days was used as he informed us that he usually had two portions of faeces in a week.
Discussion
The workers were followed for about one and a half year after the first intake.
Difference in patterns of measured activity time-course in excreta between individuals could be explained by the fact that each of them performed different tasks and also their personal attitude to radiation safety differed. Some of them personally fragmented contaminated hermetic boxes, whereas some of them worked at a distance from the very source of contamination. It is therefore possible that different people inhaled aerosol of different quality and in different time-pattern. Their contaminated work clothes put into the radioactive waste without distinguishing individual level of contamination had been a probable source of secondary internal contamination. As to the time of intake, it followed from the report describing the investigation of the incident that combination of acute and prolonged intakes was possible.
Additional information about the process of decontamination of workplace, which took place in the autumn 2001, led to the assumption that small chronic intakes were likely. This assumption was supported by the fact that surface contamination of walls in the premises in which hermetic boxes were handled was confirmed by repeated smear samples. Lower surface contamination was confirmed even about one year after the event, however, below guidance value given by the Czech Regulation on Radiation Protection (Regulation SÚJB, 2002).
Chronic intakes calculated for different workers for the periods 20 to 600 days after the first assumed intake were between 0.03 Bq/d and 0.3 Bq /d. Such intakes could lead to the annual committed effective dose from 0.2 mSv to 2 mSv.
The efficiency of the DTPA treatment is not discussed here as there were not enough samples of urine for it, however, a brief evaluation was made in Malátová (2003b) . Medical aspects of the case are discussed in (Pelclová and Fenclová, 2004) . It is important to know that the other abbreviations for the contaminated workers * the exact data when the face masks were worn were not given. were used in this paper; number 1 was used for worker MS, 2 for PV, 3 for PH, 4 for VS, 5 for LZ and 6 for FH.
Conclusions
Widespread contamination with 241 Am occurred in the building in which radiation waste was handled. Also, internal contamination of seven workers was found leading to the committed effective doses from 3 to 36 mSv. Acute intakes varied from about 135 Bq to 1300 Bq. Afterwards, small chronic intakes were found at the whole group of workers.
Many radiation protection rules have been violated during the process of work; the most important feature being that neither workers nor even staff of dosimetric control were aware that small intakes of alpha emitting radionuclides could lead to significant committed effective doses and that such intakes are not measurable by in vivo technique. It was proved again that decommissioning is the most common process in which internal contamination could occur. The cause for it is probably the long time period since the operation of facility had ceased, which could result in loss of direct knowledge (Investigation Team Report, 2000) or, when commercial company is hired, lack of comprehensive knowledge of the facility, what was the case here.
